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AVOIDING RELEASES FOR MUTUAL MISTAKE
IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
The rule of law is well settled that a general release of a claim
for personal injuries may, under the proper circumstances, be
avoided on the ground of mutual mistake as to the nature or seri-
ousness of the injury.' However, there are many variations in
the application of this rule. More specifically, many courts are at
odds in determining exactly what is required to avoid a general re-
lease for personal injuries on the ground of mutual mistake of fact.
2
The purpose of this Comment is to examine recent decisions in the
area to determine what criteria are used to allow avoidance of a
release for personal injuries for mutual mistake of fact and to sug-
gest possible steps which may be taken to alleviate some of the con-
fusion that now exists in these cases.
I. THE POLICY DICHOTOMY
The dilemma facing the courts when a question concerning
avoiding personal injury releases arises is one of conflicting poli-
cies. On the one hand is the policy of the law to encourage out of
court settlements, and the established rules of contract law dealing
with the sanctity of written documents.3 The law "cannot and does
not operate in retrospect to relieve a party from his contractual ob-
ligations, deliberately and intentionally assumed, because of the
subsequent development of unfortunate and unforseen results."' 4
The philosophy is that in the absence of fraud, duress or other un-
fair conduct on the part of the releasee, the law should extend its
protection to afford stability to the transaction by upholding the
express terms of the release.
To hold otherwise would create a legal situation which
would make it impossible, or at least inadvisable, to settle
1. See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960); Annot., 48 A.L.R.
1462 (1927).
2. This Comment is limited to a discussion of the requirements
necessary to avoid a release for mutual mistake of fact. Cases involving
other grounds on which a release may be avoided, such as fraud, misrep-
resentation, overreaching or unilateral mistake are outside the scope of this
article, except as they relate to the application of the doctrine of mutual
mistake.
3. See, e.g., Page v. Means, 192 F. Supp. 475 (9th Cir. 1959); Nogan
v. Berry, 193 A.2d 79 (Del. 1963); Swilley v. Long, 215 So. 2d 340 (Fla.
Dist. App. 1968); Smith v. Loos, 78 N.M. 339, 431 P.2d 72 (1967); Wheeler
v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore., 229 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961);
Bollinger v. Randall, 184 Pa. Super. 644, 135 A.2d 802 (1957).
4. Smith v. Loos, 78 N.M. 339, 343, 431 P.2d 72, 76 (1967).
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any suit. Settlements are necessarily based on facts which
are then available to the parties and there is always the risk
that injuries may prove to be more serious or less serious
than contemplated, and there is always the disputed ques-
tion of liability to be considered. If a release is to be lightly
set aside for no other reason than the parties were mistaken
as to the extent of the injuries, the effect of a release and
the advantage of a settlement would be lost. Under these
circumstances defendants would be compelled to let every
suit go to trial in order to obtain an adverse judgment which
would be binding and final. Many cases . . . would never
be settled and plaintiffs, instead of receiving funds immedi-
ately, would be compelled to wait for their damages and
undergo additional expenses in proving their cases, always
with the risk that the verdict would go against them.5
On the other hand, if the releasor is bound by the literal terms
of the release, he may be left with little or no compensation for
injuries caused by another. This is especially noxious in that the
releasee is usually an insurer who has been paid to assume the
risk and is receiving a windfall by avoiding liability.6 The philos-
ophy behind treating personal injury releases as voidable recog-
nizes the human factors involved. As was noted in Clancy v.
Pacenti:
7
It is not an article of commerce that is involved, but the
human mind and body, still the most complicated and
mysterious of all things that are upon or inhabit the earth.
Here, mistakes are easily made and the consequences are
more serious than in any other of the affairs of man. A
slight abrasion may mean nothing or it may lead to a malig-
nancy. Insignificant pain may mean the beginning of a
fatal coronary attack or only a slight intestinal disturb-
ance. Yet, a man cannot and does not live in dread of these
possibilities. He accepts assurances that all will be well,
even though ultimate consequences cannot be appraised
as in matters involving property or services. 8
Furthermore, it has been recognized that as between releasor
and releasee there is a disparity of bargaining power. The release
is usually drafted by experts and presented on a take it or leave it
basis, while the releasor is generally without knowledge of legal
documents, without assistance of legal counsel, and anxious to make
a fast settlement so as to assure himself of at least some recovery.9
5. Bollinger v. Randall, 184 Pa. Super. 644, 650, 135 A.2d 802, 806
(1957).
6. See, e.g., Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 307 (1963); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957).
7. 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957).
8. Id. at 176, 145 N.E.2d at 805.
9. See, e.g., Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal.
These considerations have long been recognized as warranting spe-
cial treatment for releases in personal injury cases. 10
II. THE DETERMINATIONS OF FACT
There is relatively little difficulty in stating the rule of law
which is appropriate in cases dealing with avoiding releases for
personal injuries, for it is universally accepted. The problem arises
when the universally accepted rule is interpreted and applied to
the fact patterns presented. Williston states the general rule to be:
A release though in general terms will be reformed so as
to cover merely the right with regard to which the parties
were dealing and exclude the rights of which they were
ignorant. 1
The right to set aside a release will occur if there is a mutual
mistake of past or present material fact, but not if there is a mistake
in prophecy or opinion relative to an uncertain future event, such
as probable developments from and permanency of a known in-
jury. 2 In order to prove a mistake of material fact, it is critical
to show that the parties intended the release to apply only to the
facts as they were known at the time of settlement. In this re-
gard, Williston says:
[W]here a release is given by one injured in an accident
and more serious injuries develop than were supposed to
exist at the time of settlement, it is a question of fact
whether the parties assumed as a basis of the release the
known injuries, or whether the intent was to make a com-
promise for whatever injuries from the accident might
exist whether known or not.13
Before a release will be set aside, the court must therefore
make a two-fold determination of fact. First, it must find that
the mistake went to an existing material fact, i.e., that the injury
was not known to exist at the time of settlement. If the subse-
quent injury is actually the unexpected consequence of an injury
Rptr. 307 (1963); Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802
(1957); Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore, 229 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d
527 (1961).
10. Dean Wigmore states:
In general, the modern trend is to lay down no one or more rules
of thumb, but to develop a special doctrine in each Court for that
class of cases, liberally relieving the party who has signed the
release.
9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2416 (3d ed. 1940).
11. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1551 (rev. ed. 1937):
Equity will reform or rescind a release given for accidental in-
juries, but the more common recognition of the equitable rule al-
lowing avoidance of a release for mutual mistake of material fact
occurs where the release is set aside in an action at law brought to
recover damages for the unknown injury.
See also, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 504 (1932).
12. See, e.g., Ormsby v. Ginofli, 107 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist. App. 1958);
Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957); Birch v. Keen, 449
P.2d 700 (Okla. 1969); 76 C.J.S. Release § 25 (1952).
13. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1551 (rev. ed. 1937).
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already known to exist at the time of settlement, it falls in the
category of a mistake of opinion relative to an uncertain future
event and will not be sufficient to warrant setting aside the re-
lease. Secondly, the court must determine that the parties intended
that the release cover only known injuries. If it is apparent that
the parties also intended the release to cover all future injuries,
including any unforeseen injury, the release will not be set aside.
III. UNKNOWN INJURY VS. UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES
or KNOWN INJURIES
The area in which the courts have been most at variance is in
the application of the mistake doctrine, for there is often a very
fine distinction in determining whether an injury was unknown at
the time of settlement, or whether it is merely a consequence of a
known injury that was unexpected at the time of the settlement.
There is relatively little difficulty when a releasor is not aware
that he has suffered any injury at the time of signing the release.
Here, both parties are laboring under a mistake of fact and the
release will ordinarily be set aside.14 If the releasor is unaware
of his injuries because of his own negligence in failing to consult a
physician, however, the release will not be set aside because the
14. Bennie v. Pastor, 393 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968) (judgment for re-
leasor affirmed where release signed within 20 days for $308.79 property
damage, injury to back discovered several weeks later); Evans v. S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963) (judgment for releasor
when release made without consideration within four weeks to enable
owner-driver to recover for property damage, but subsequently discov-
ered severe head injury); Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28
Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963) (directed verdict for release reversed where re-
lease for $490.90 to cover property damage executed within one month,
compression fracture of vertabra and herniated disc discovered two months
after accident); Hye v. Riggin, 208 A.2d 513 (Del. Super. 1964) (releasee's
motion for summary judgment denied where release for $69.85 property
damage executed within three weeks, minor pain at time of accident had
ceased by the time of release); Ormsby v. Ginolfi, 107 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1958) (release made in eight days for $90.08 property damages, seri-
ous injuries discovered later); Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d
537 (1957) (judgment for releasor where injuries discovered after release
for $50.00 property damage signed); Cady v. Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16,
220 A.2d 373 (1966) (judgment affirmed for husband and wife releasors
where release executed nine days after accident for amount of property
damage, wife was included in release as a precaution even though she was
unaware of any injury at the time); Groh v. Huckel, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 172
(C.P. Alleg. 1964) (release for $90.00 one month after accident, releasor's
symptoms of herniated disc appeared two months after accident); Emery
v. Mackiewicz, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 443 (C.P. Luz. 1962) (release executed in
seven weeks, herniated disc discovered later); Kerr v. May, 24 Pa. D. &
C.2d 97 (C.P. Alleg. 1960) (release within three weeks for $79.75 property
damage, symptoms of whiplash injury appeared four weeks after accident).
releasor was the culpable party.15
The problem arises when the releasor is aware that he has sus-
tained an injury prior to signing the release but does not discover
the true nature or extent of injury until after the settlement.
Whether a subsequently discovered injury was unknown at the
time the settlement was made, or whether it was merely a con-
sequence of a known injury that was unknown is a question of
fact. However, most of the inconsistencies noted in the cases re-
sulted from the manner in which the courts determined this fact.
Ordinarily, if the injury actually sustained is of a completely dif-
ferent nature from what the parties had mutually believed at the
time of settlement, the release will be set aside on the ground that
the settlement was based on mistaken material facts. 16 However,
the court has refused to set aside the release for a bump on the
head which later resulted in a hematoma, 17 a subsequent develop-
ment of pseudarthrosis with respect to the mending of a broken
leg,1 8 the subsequent aggravation of ulcers by trauma in a colli-
15. Mannke v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 251 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Pa.
1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1966) (release not avoidable where re-
leasor was aware of his injury, did not consult a physician, and permitted
more than a month to elapse before signing release); Hutcheson v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Ark. 1962) (summary judgment for re-
leasee where releasor knew of back injury but failed to disclose injury to
insurer at the time release was executed); Nogan v. Berry, 193 A.2d 79
(Del. 1963) (releasee's motion for summary judgment granted where re-
leasor, aware of some injury, failed to use reasonable diligence to deter-
mine its extent before signing release); Sosa v. Velvet Dairy Stores, Inc.,
407 S.W.2d 615 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1966) (releasee's motion for sum-
mary judgment granted where releasor, aware of minor injury immediately
after accident, failed to see a doctor before signing release and stated in
the accident report that she had received no injuries).
16. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Buss, 188 F. Supp. 895 (D. Kan.
1960) (release for $300.00 for mere broken leg avoided when subsequent
knowledge revealed fracture to be so serious that there was risk of ampu-
tation and loss of life, release signed seventeen days after accident while
releasor still in hospital); Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962)
(new trial granted releasor where releasor signed over consideration to
property damage claimant within three weeks of accident thinking she had
only a bruised knee, fractured kneecap and torn ligaments discovered
later); Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960) (judg-
ment for releasor affirmed where release executed on basis of known
minor injury, subsequent discovery of subdural hematoma resulting in men-
tal incompetency justified avoiding release for mutual mistake); Hall v.
Strom Constr. Co., 368 Mich. 253, 118 NW.2d 281 (1962) (use of release
enjoined where release signed within one month for $425.00 in considera-
tion for superficial back and head injuries, brain injury resulting in epi-
lepsy discovered later); Ware v. Geismer, 8 Mich. App. 627, 155 N.W.2d 257
(1968) (judgment for releasor affirmed avoiding release signed for $600.00
where parties were aware releasor had suffered injuries to head and back
but were unaware of internal injuries serious enough to subsequently cause
a heart attack); Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 203 N.E.2d 237
(1964) (judgment for releasor where only stiff neck known at time of
settlement and herniated disc discovered one year later, release within five
weeks for $20.19 property damage).
17. Smith v. Loos, 78 N.M. 339, 431 P.2d 72 (1967).
18. Hoopes v. Lamb, 102 Ariz. 335, 429 P.2d 447 (1967).
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sion,'9 or an injury to the eye which resulted in blindness. 20
An especially difficult problem arises from what is the most
prolific source of cases in this area-the whiplash injury in auto-
mobile accidents. Since the symptoms often appear minor, or
are not apparent at all until months after the accident, releases are
frequently signed before the extent of injury is known. Here
again, if there were no signs of injury before settlement, the re-
lease will be set aside on the ground of mutual mistake. 21 How-
ever, when the releasor is aware of some whiplash injury, and
discovers it to be much more serious after signing a release, the
courts are split on the question of mistake. The majority of cases
have held that the subsequent discovery of more serious effects
from the whiplash is not the discovery of an unknown injury, but
merely the consequence of a known injury, which is not sufficient
to set aside the release.2 2 Those courts which have found the more
serious effect to be a new and unknown injury have stated that
pain in the injured area,23 being badly shaken,24 an assumed back
sprain,25 or an assumed recurrence of bursitis26 were not equiva-
lent to knowledge of a herniated disc.
It is in the factual determination of whether the injury is a
new and unknown injury or whether it is merely the consequence
of a known injury that the courts are in the most confusion. Each
court, it seems, is developing its own doctrine to apply to each of
these classes of cases. Unfortunately, it is the innocent injured
19. Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill. App. 2d 288, 155 N.E.2d 827 (1959).
20. Bollinger v. Randall, 184 Pa. Super. 644, 135 A.2d 802 (1957),
21. Bennie v. Pastor, 393 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968); Casey v. Proctor,
59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963); Hye v. Riggin, 208 A.2d
513 (Del. Super. 1964); Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 203
N.E.2d 237 (1964); Cady v. Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966);
Groh v. Huckel, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 172 (C.P. Alleg. 1964); Kerr v. May,
24 Pa. D. & C.2d 97 (C.P. Alleg. 1960).
22. Randolph v. Ottenstein, 238 F. Supp. 1011 (D.D.C. 1965); Hutche-
son v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Ark. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 818
(8th Cir. 1963); Nogan v. Berry, 193 A.2d 79 (Del. 1963); Reason v. Lewis,
250 A.2d 390 (Del. Super. 1969); DeWitt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d
898 (Fla. 1957); Swilley v. Long, 215 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. App. 1968);
Welsh v. Centa, 75 Ill. App. 2d 103, 221 N.E.2d 106 (1966); Sosa v. Velvet
Dairy Stores, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 615 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1966); Birch v.
Keen, 449 P.2d 700 (Okla. 1969); Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of
Ore, 229 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961); Cotman v. Whitehead, 209 Va. 377,
164 S.E.2d 681 (1968).
23. Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho 376, 421 P.2d 747 (1966); Emery v. Mack-
iewicz, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 443 (C.P. Luz. 1962).
24. Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d 97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307
(1963).
25. Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957).
26. Reynolds v. Merrill, - Utah -, 460 P.2d 323 (1969).
party who frequently suffers the hardship resulting from the in-
herently difficult fact determinations.
IV. INTENT
If it is established that the releasor is suffering from an injury
that was unknown at the time of settlement, the element of intent
of the parties at the time of settlement must be considered. It is
generally stated that a release will be ineffectual to cover unknown
claims unless the surrounding circumstances indicate that both
parties contemplated their inclusion.27 It is therefore necessary to
examine the factors influencing a court when it resolves the ques-
tion of whether, in spite of the inclusive language of the release,
the parties intended the settlement to compensate only for known
injuries, or whether they also intended to include injuries unknown
at the time of settlement.
A. Consideration
The first factor to be considered is the amount of consideration
compared with the risk of unknown injury. Although inadequacy
of consideration is not ordinarily, of itself, a sufficient basis for
cancellation of an executed release, along with other circumstances
it is an important indication of the parties' intent.2  Where the
consideration for the release is limited to the amount of property
damage sustained in an accident, there is an indication that the
parties did not intend the settlement to compensate for personal
injuries that may also have been sustained;29 likewise when a re-
lease is executed for no consideration." However, when the con-
sideration includes an amount greater than the property damage,
and especially when that amount is also greater than the amount
of medical expenses to the date of settlement, the courts will con-
sider this as an indication that the parties meant the release to in-
clude all compensation for bodily injuries, known and unknown."
B. Discussion of Personal Injuries
If pre-settlement negotiations do not include a discussion of
personal injuries and the amount, if any, of compensation attribut-
27. See, e.g., Cady v. Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966).
28. See, e.g., Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962).
29. See, e.g., Bennie v. Pastor, 393 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968) (settlement
of $308.79 property damage set aside when disc injury subsequently dis-
covered); Hye v. Riggin, 208 A.2d 513 (Del. Super. 1964) (settlement of
$69.85 property damage set aside when more serious injuries from whip-
lash discovered); Ware v. Geismer, 8 Mich. App. 627, 155 N.W.2d 257 (1968)
(settlement of $600.00 avoided when internal injury serious enough to cause
heart attack found).
30. Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963);
Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962).
31. Swilley v. Long, 215 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. App. 1968); Welsh v.
Centa, 75 Ill. App. 2d 103, 221 N.E.2d 106 (1966); Van Avery v. Seiter, 13
Mich. App. 88, 163 N.W.2d 643 (1968); Birch v. Keen, 449 P.2d 700 (Okla.
1969). But see Reynolds v. Merrill, - Utah -, 460 P.2d 323 (1969).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
able thereto as consideration for the release, there is a strong indi-
cation that the parties did not contemplate the release to cover any-
thing more than the property damage.32 Conversely, when prelimi-
nary negotiations include a discussion of personal injuries, and the
amount of settlement includes some compensation for medical bills
or pain and suffering, the courts will conclude that the parties fully
intended the settlement to be full compensation for injuries re-
ceived.33 However, if the reason that there was no discussion of
personal injuries before settlement was that the releasor did not
mention them even though he was aware that he had sustained
some injury, the courts will not avoid the release. In these cases,
the releasor was prevented from receiving compensation for his
injuries because he either negligently failed to see a doctor before
signing the release,34 or simply passed them off as too minor to
merit mention where, with reasonable diligence, the extent of in-
jury could have been ascertained.
5
C. Bargaining and Negotiating
Another factor in determining intent is the presence or ab-
sence of bargaining and negotiating leading to the settlement. If
the settlement and release are presented on a take it or leave it
basis, the courts will recognize the inferior bargaining position of
the releasor and hold that it was not the intent of both parties to
be bound by the release if further injuries were to arise.3 6 If the
facts show that the parties did, in fact, negotiate a settlement and
come to a true compromise agreement, the release will not be set
aside merely because subsequent events show the settlement to
32. Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1963);
Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962); Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal. 2d
97, 378 P.2d 579, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1963); Hye v. Riggin, 208 A.2d 513 (Del.
Super. 1964); Ware v. Geismer, 8 Mich. App. 627, 155 N.W.2d 257 (1968);
Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 203 N.E.2d 237 (1964); Cady v.
Mitchell, 208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966).
33. Randolph v. Ottenstein, 238 F. Supp. 1011 (D.D.C. 1965); Hoopes
v. Lamb, 102 Ariz. 335, 429 P.2d 447 (1967); Reason v. Lewis, 250 A.2d 390
(Del. Super. 1969); Swilley v. Long, 215 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Dist. App. 1968);
Welsh v. Centa, 75 Ill. App. 2d 103, 221 N.E.2d 106 (1966); Van Avery v.
Seiter, 13 Mich. App. 88, 163 N.W.2d 643 (1968); Smith v. Loos, 78 N.M. 339,
431 P.2d 72 (1967); Birch v. Keen, 449 P.2d 700 (Okla. 1969); Wheeler V.
White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore., 229 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961); Bol-
linger v. Randall, 184 Pa. Super. 644, 135 A.2d 802 (1957).
34. Mannke v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 251 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Pa.
1966), aff'd, 375 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1966); Sosa v. Velvet Dairy Stores, Inc.,
407 S.W.2d 615 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1966).
35. Hutcheson v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Ark. 1962),
aff'd, 315 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1963); Nogan v. Berry, 193 A.2d 79 (1963).
36. Evans v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 315 F.2d 335 F.2d 335 (2d Cir.
1963); Sloan v. Standard Oil Co., 177 Ohio St. 149, 203 N.E.2d 237 (1964).
be improvident.8?
D. Disputed Liability
When, at the time of settlement, there was a legitimate ques-
tion between the parties as to the releasee's liability and the amount
of damages, the courts will be more easily persuaded to uphold the
settlement as a compromise in situations which might otherwise
justify the conclusion that there was a mutual mistake.38 When
there is no question as to liability, the courts will more closely
scrutinize the terms of the release for indications of overreaching
on the part of the releasee. 39
E. Haste In Securing Release
Where it appears that the release was secured so soon after the
occurrence of the accident that the parties did not have adequate
time to assess the extent of the injuries, this will be a factor tending
to support the contention that there was a mistake,40 especially
when it appears that the haste was the result of pressure exerted
by the releasee. However, where the injured party is not pressured
into signing a release, has adequate time to assess his injuries and
defers settlement until he can make an investigation as to their
nature and extent, the indication is that the parties intended the
settlement and release to be inclusive and final.4 1 A similar con-
clusion will be reached when it is the releasor who puts pressure
on the releasee to come to a quick settlement. 42
None of the above factors are conclusive, of themselves, to
warrant sustaining or avoiding a release. However, taken with all
other surrounding circumstances, they should be considered when
determining whether or not both parties intended the release to
cover all claims, both known and unknown, or whether, irrespec-
tive of the inclusive terms of the release, the parties intended only a
limited release of claims.
V. PRESENT LEGISLATION
Unfortunately, many releases of personal injury claims are
made in a setting of haste, grief, or dazed acquiescence. The re-
37. Reason v. Lewis, 250 A.2d 390 (Del. Super. 1969); Welsh v. Centa,
75 Ill. App. 2d 103, 221 N.E.2d 106 (1966); Van Avery v. Seiter, 13 Mich.
App. 88, 163 N.W.2d 643 (1968).
38. Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 111. App. 2d 288, 155 N.E.2d 827 (1959);
Van Avery v. Seiter, 13 Mich. App. 88, 163 N.W.2d 643 (1968); Sosa v.
Velvet Dairy Stores, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 615 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1966);
Bollinger v. Randall, 184 Pa. Super. 644, 135 A.2d 802 (1957).
39. Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960).
40. Hall v. Strom Constr. Co., 368 Mich. 253, 118 N.W.2d 281 (1962);
Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957); Cady v. Mitchell,
208 Pa. Super. 16, 220 A.2d 373 (1966); Groh v. Huckel, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d
172 (C.P. Alleg. 1964).
41. Welsh v. Centa, 75 Ill. App. 2d 103, 221 N.E.2d 106 (1966); Van
Avery v. Seiter, 13 Mich. App. 88, 163 N.W.2d 643 (1968).
42. Randolph v. Ottenstein, 238 F. Supp. 1011 (D.D.C. 1965).
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leasor is normally in an inferior bargaining position, unfamiliar
with the terms and ramifications of legal documents and without
assistance of legal counsel. Too often, the temptation to obtain a
quick financial settlement, and thereby avoid the necessity of await-
ing the outcome of extended litigation, will cause the injured party
to release his rights to a personal injury claim for an amount sub-
stantially below their worth. In recognition of the setting in which
many of these transactions occur, several states have enacted legis-
lation to give some, although still limited, protection to the injured
party.
The most limited legislative protection is by statutes which
apply only where a release has been signed by a patient while he is
confined in a hospital or sanitarium.4 These statutes make the
release void 44 or voidable 45 if it was signed within either ten 46 or
fifteen 47 days after the injury occurred. However, even this pro-
tection may be waived if the releasor indicates his willingness, in
writing, to sign the release five days prior to doing so.4" Since
these statutes apply only in the limited situation where the release
is executed while the releasor is actually confined in the hospital,
and then only during the first weeks following the injury, it is
43. Typical of this approach is the Maine statute:
[N]o settlement or general release or statement in writing signed
y any person confined in a hospital or sanitarium as a patient
with reference to any personal injuries for which said person is
confined in said hospital or sanitarium shall be admissible in evi-
dence, used or referred to in any manner at the trial of any action
to recover damages for personal injuries or consequential damages,
so called, resulting therefrom, which statement, settlement or gen-
eral release was obtained within 10 days after the injuries were
sustained and such release shall be null and void.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3964 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS AwN. § 9-19-12
(1956). New York's version is a criminal statute, making it unlawful to
enter a hospital for the purpose of obtaining a release within fifteen days
after the injury was sustained. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 480 (McKinney
1948). Any release obtained in violation of this section, however, is only
presumptively invalid. Fleming v. Ponziani, 29 App. Div. 2d 881, 288 N.Y.S.
2d (1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 105, 247 N.E.2d 114, 299 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1969).
44. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3964 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 9-19-12 (1956).
45. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 480 (McKinney 1948).
46. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3964 (1964).
47. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 480 (McKinney 1948); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 9-19-12 (1956).
48. Rhode Island's statute states that any release obtained in contra-
vention of its protective language will be null and void
... unless at least five (5) days prior to the obtaining or procur-
ing of such general release or statement such injured party had
signified in writing his willingness that such general release or
statement be given.
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-12 (1956); N.Y. JUDICIAL LAW § 480 (Mc-
Kinney 1948).
readily apparent that they are of such narrow scope as to be of
little value in the majority of cases.
The second general category of statutes are those which make
any release signed by an injured party within a stipulated length
of time after the injury voidable at the releasor's option.49 Two of
these statutes also contain a time limit within which the releasor
must exercise his option to void the release.50 This type of statute
is more satisfactory in that its application is not limited to releases
which have been signed in the hopsital.
The third category of legislation is that which, in effect, codi-
fies the rule of equity that a court may set aside a release on the
ground of mutual mistake where the mistake has materially af-
fected the amount of the settlement.5 1 These statutes do not ex-
tend the right to avoid a release beyond what judicial decision has
done in other jurisdictions. 52 As in the jurisdictions which have
not enacted such legislation, the essence of the doctrine is that the
wording of the release is not conclusive. There still remains a
question of fact as to whether the parties intended to discharge all
liability at the time of settlement. 3 However, if it is determined
that the parties to the settlement did, in fact, intend that the re-
lease discharge all claims, known and unknown, then the release
will be valid notwithstanding the language of the statute. This
type of statute can hardly be said to give any added measure of
protection to the releasor since it merely accomplishes legislatively
what other jurisdictions have accomplished by judicial decision.
49. Connecticut's statute is typical:
No person, firm or corporation whose interest is adverse to that
of a person receiving personal injuries as the result of a tortious
act shall negotiate any contract, written or oral, or any settlement
to release such person, firm or corporation from liability within
fifteen days from the date of the tortious act. Any contract, settle-
ment or release obtained in violation of this section shall be void-
able at the option of the releasor upon restoration of the consid-
eration.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572a (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-113
(1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, § 11 (1957); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-
12.1 (Supp. 1967).
50. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-113 (1967) (release executed within fif-
teen days after the injury is voidable within one year after the release);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, § 11 (1957) (release signed within five days after
the injury is voidable within sixty days).
51. California's statute is typical:
A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor
does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the time of exe-
cuting the release, which if known by him must have ma-
terially affected his settlement with the debtor.
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1542 (Deering 1960); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 58-510
(1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-13-02 (1959); S.D. CODE § 47.0241 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3002 (Supp. 1969) (allowing rescission of settle-
ment without return of consideration where settlement brought about by
fraud or mistake).






In view of the unconformity of the decisions among the various
courts in this area of law, and in view of the potential financial
burdens an innocent party may unwittingly be forced to assume
by executing an improvident release, it is submitted that a legisla-
tive solution is needed to adequately protect the releasor and add
stability to the law. The enactment must be of such character as to
allow the parties to contract as they choose while giving the releasor
additional remedies, within limits, for avoiding the release if the
settlement is greatly disproportionate to the damages suffered.
It is suggested that the solution lies in legislation patterned
after the Idaho and Maryland statutes. 4 The statute should in-
clude provisions allowing a release signed during a stipulated period
to be voided at the option of the releasor, with the right to exercise
that option of limited duration. It is submitted that a statue would
meet the requirements of the needed legislation if it provides that:
(1) any release signed by any person within sixty days after he
incurs a personal injury, which may adversely affect his right to
be compensated for such injury, shall be voidable at the option of
the releasor; and (2) that such option to void the release must be
exercised within six months from the date that the injury is in-
curred.
The great majority of settlements involving danger to the re-
leasor have been made within the sixty day period following the
accident. Thus, a readily accessible means to avoid an improvident
release executed within that time would be provided. On the other
hand, any settlement made more than sixty days after the injury is
sustained will presumably be based on more reliable information as
to the nature and extent of the injury. Thus, during the period
when the releasor is most likely to make an unwise settlement due
to the unknown or unsuspected consequences of his injury, he will
be adequately protected. However, in the interests of encouraging
out of court settlements, this protection should not be open-ended.
Therefore, the releasor would have the limited period of six months
in which to avoid the improvident release, after which the settle-
ment would become binding and final, unless set aside by a court
under the circumstances discussed in previous sections of this
Comment.
The advantage of such a statute would obviously be that an
injured party could more readily avoid a release when it appears
54. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-113 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 79, § 11
(1957).
that he has a greater claim for damages than originally expected.
This would take the great majority of cases dealing with avoiding
releases for personal injuries off the overcrowded court dockets.
However, the primary purpose of such legislation is not to allow
the releasor to avoid the release, but to prevent an unfair release
from ever arising. The statute, in effect, would help to equalize
the bargaining positions of the parties. The releasee, rather than
trying to rush the settlement so as to obtain a release before any
greater injury is discovered would be forced to recognize that an
inadequate early settlement could be easily voided. Both parties
would gain by waiting before entering into a settlement-the re-
leasor by having a greater opportunity to determine the nature and
extent of his injuries, and the releasee by assuring himself that the
settlement ultimately agreed upon will not be set aside because it
was entered into before the parties knew what injuries had been
sustained. Yet the waiting period is not so long that it would dis-
courage settlements, nor is it so long that the injured party loses the
advantage of receiving funds relatively soon after the accident. The
true effect of the statute would be to make both parties wait until
they could make a more informed determination of the nature and
extent of injuries suffered by the releasor.
VII. CONCLUSION
It appears that a significant number of general releases ex-
ecuted in personal injury cases have been avoided by the courts
on the ground of mutual mistake. Many other releases have been
attacked in court but upheld because the releasor failed to suffi-
ciently prove a mutual mistake of material fact, or the intent of
the parties to limit the settlement only to the injuries as they were
known at the time of the release. The latter cases work a tremen-
dous hardship on the injured party even though at times he may
be somewhat blameworthy. In recognition of the inferior bargain-
ing position of the releasor, and in order to more adequately pro-
tect the injured party who may be strongly tempted to prematurely
release his claim for personal injury damages, a legislative solution
is needed. Such a statute would also be beneficial in that it would
minimize the number of cases of this type which would ever get to
court. It would therefore be of advantage to both parties to a
personal injury settlement, and to the judiciary, if the legislature
would enact the needed legislation.
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